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CORPORATE VICTIMS OF “VICTIMLESS 
CRIME”: HOW THE FCPA’S STATUTORY 
AMBIGUITY, COUPLED WITH STRICT 
LIABILITY, HURTS BUSINESSES AND 
DISCOURAGES COMPLIANCE 
Abstract: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), a federal law that 
outlaws corporate bribery of foreign officials, is the key legislation in the 
fight against global corruption. Unfortunately, despite the long-awaited 
guidance recently issued by the Department of Justice, the unpredictabil-
ity and severity of FCPA enforcement, coupled with the lack of an affirma-
tive defense in cases of adequate compliance, continues to take a substan-
tial toll on U.S. businesses and the economy. This Note argues against 
strict corporate vicarious liability and evaluates the unintended effects of 
a broad interpretation of the FCPA on international business practices. 
Suggesting that current enforcement practices might actually reduce 
compliance, this Note evaluates several proposed solutions and advocates 
for a hybrid approach that would resolve the ambiguity and make com-
pliance both feasible and economically viable. 
Bribing foreign officials is wrong, but not everything governments do to pre-
vent it is wise or proportional. 
—The Economist1 
Introduction 
 On January 17, 2012, Marubeni Corporation, a Japanese trading 
company, agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) $54.6 
million in criminal penalties for its alleged participation in a conspiracy 
to bribe Nigerian officials in violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (“FCPA”).2 Marubeni was also required to retain a corporate 
                                                                                                                      
1 A Tale of Two Laws: America’s Anti-Corruption Law Deters Foreign Investment. Britain’s Is 
Smarter, Economist, Sept. 17, 2011, at 68, 68 [hereinafter A Tale of Two Laws], available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21529103. 
2 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty ( Jan. 17, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-060.html. 
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compliance consultant and cooperate with the DOJ’s investigations.3 
This settlement is just one of numerous cases in which foreign compa-
nies must pay multi-million-dollar fines to the U.S. government for vio-
lations of the U.S. law, even when the questioned conduct took place in 
a foreign jurisdiction.4 
 The U.S. government’s broad ability to penalize foreign conduct 
by foreign companies is made possible by the anti-bribery provisions of 
the FCPA, a federal law that outlaws corporate bribery of foreign offi-
cials and imposes strict penalties on violators.5 Although the FCPA con-
tains two major provisions, covering both accounting and anti-bribery 
standards, this Note focuses exclusively on the anti-bribery provisions 
that apply to corrupt corporate conduct and their criminal enforce-
ment by the DOJ.6 
 Despite being a domestic U.S. criminal law, the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions apply not only to U.S. businesses, but also to any foreign 
company or individual as long as any part of the bribery takes place 
within the United States.7 Companies charged with making illegal pay-
ments in violation of FCPA rules are universally condemned and are 
viewed as deserving their heavy punishments and multi-million dollar 
fines.8 Although this view is certainly true in many cases and the fight 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Daniel P. Levison & Jarod G. Taylor, The Expansive Reach of the FCPA Extends to Ja-
pan Again: A Second Japanese Company Resolves FCPA Charges Related to a Nigerian Bribery Scan-
dal, Morrison Foerster, 1 (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/images/ 
120130-FCPA-Japan.pdf. 
4 See Joe Palazzolo, Of Top 10 FCPA Settlements, 8 Involve Foreign Companies, Wall St. J. Cor-
ruption Currents (Nov. 5, 2010, 10:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/ 
2010/11/05/of-top-10-fcpa-settlements-8-involve-foreign-companies (noting that in 2010, the 
list of the top ten FCPA settlements of all time contained eight foreign businesses). 
5 See Lay-Person’s Guide, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Antibribery Provisions, U.S. Dep’t 
Just. 1–2, 5, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Lay-Person’s Guide]. 
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1–dd-3 (2006). The anti-bribery provisions are some-
times called the centerpiece of the FCPA. See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. 
Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf. This Note does not discuss civil en-
forcement of accounting provisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See infra 
notes 30–253 and accompanying text. 
7 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. Int’l L. & 
Com. Reg. 239, 288–89 (2001). 
8 See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4100–01 
(noting that corporate bribery is “morally repugnant” and “fundamentally destructive” to 
the free market, and that it damages both the U.S. economy and the stability of foreign 
businesses). 
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against corruption is indeed a matter of utmost importance, this Note 
argues that instead of being offenders, corporations themselves are fre-
quently victims of corporate bribery and the broad reach of the am-
biguous terms of the FCPA.9 
 The ambiguity of the FCPA’s terms hurts businesses.10 It causes 
multinational corporations to bear the significant risks of FCPA prose-
cution without sufficient regard to their costly efforts to comply with 
the anti-bribery provisions.11 In November 2012, the DOJ issued a long-
awaited, substantive resource guide to FCPA enforcement.12 It is too 
early to tell how much this report, entitled A Resource Guide to the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“Resource Guide”), will affect corporations’ 
business decisions.13 Some observers have noted, however, that al-
though the report is detailed and useful, it is largely a compilation of 
publicly available information that was previously scattered across a va-
riety of sources.14 The 120-page Resource Guide provides “little new in-
formation,” and most pages simply describe the FCPA statute, related 
substantive laws, and earlier decisions and opinions.15 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 112–193 and accompanying text. 
10 See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and 
Fragmentation, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 257, 287 (1999); infra notes 163–193 and accompanying 
text. 
11 See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Bus. Law. 1233, 1235–36 (2007) (noting that current law 
does not provide adequate guidance to companies building their compliance policies, and 
offers little direction on what can be considered sufficient to safeguard companies from 
vicarious responsibility). 
12 See Criminal Div., U.S. DOJ & Enforcement Div., U.S. SEC, A Resource Guide to 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter Resource Guide]. 
13 See id. 
14 See, e.g., David Bario, New Guidance Doesn’t Mollify FCPA Critics, but Offers Cheat Sheet for 
Playing Fair, AmLaw Litig. Daily (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com/digest 
TAL.jsp?id=1202578394090&New_Guidance_Doesnt_Mollify_FCPA_Critics_but_Offers_ 
Cheat_Sheet_for_Playing_Fair&slreturn=20121123004159; Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Guidance Is 
Here!, Wall St. J. L. Blog (Nov. 14, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/ 
11/14/fcpa-guidance-is-here (noting that the report articulates views long held by the 
prosecutors and known to practitioners); Marc Rosenberg, DOJ and SEC Issue FCPA Guidance, 
Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Nov. 28, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://blogs. 
law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/11/28/doj-and-sec-issue-fcpa-guidance (noting that al-
though the Resource Guide constitutes a “comprehensive overview,” it does not make any 
changes to the DOJ’s enforcement procedures); Samuel Rubenfeld et al., The Guidance: 
The FCPA Bar Reacts, Wall St. J. Corruption Currents, (Nov. 14, 2012, 4:32 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/11/14/the-guidance-the-fcpa-bar-reacts (quoting 
practitioners who praised the guidance as useful and significant, but noted that it was not 
“earthshaking” or a “panacea”). 
15 See Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 7 White Collar 
Crime Rep. 961, 963 (2012). 
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DOJ guidance rejects “formulaic requirements,” and instead calls for a 
broad, common-sense approach, leaving considerable ambiguity and 
discretion—and thus unpredictability—in the enforcement process.16 
 Corporations remain particularly vulnerable because of the FCPA’s 
broad jurisdictional reach, which allows for the imposition of vicarious 
liability on the actions of their joint venture partners, agents, or even 
third parties acting in far-away locations.17 Despite this vulnerability, 
multinational corporations lack a strong and consistent defense to FCPA 
accusations.18 Because of the broad terms of the statute, the limited ju-
dicial review of FCPA sanctions, and business’s hesitancy to litigate, cor-
porations are left with little real bargaining power and often feel forced 
to accept prosecutors’ settlement terms, no matter how harsh.19 Federal 
prosecutors concede that corporations can be victims of FCPA violations 
perpetuated by their own executives, who abuse their position of trust 
and engage in unlawful conduct without authorization.20 Nevertheless, 
today there is little a corporation can do to avoid prosecution for the 
unauthorized acts of its employees or the resulting hefty penalties and 
damaging publicity.21 In turn, such helplessness leads to an undesired 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 56; see also Koehler, supra note 15, at 967 (ar-
guing that FCPA enforcement remains obscure despite the guidance); Palazzolo, supra 
note 14 (noting that the DOJ report did not provide the “firm policy pronouncements” 
hoped for by the FCPA’s critics). 
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting companies from offering anything 
of value to “any person” with knowledge that even part of this payment will be offered to a 
foreign official); see also Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Conse-
quences of Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, 32 Hamline L. Rev. 529, 556 (2009) (commenting that growth in global com-
merce exposes even smaller companies lacking “legal sophistication” to FCPA scrutiny); 
Erik Vollebregt, Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA: Recommendations for U.S. Medical Device 
Companies with Activities in Europe, 65 Food & Drug L.J. 347, 352 (2010) (noting that the 
globalization of commerce increases the potential for FCPA scrutiny, and citing the health 
care industry as a sector particularly vulnerable to FCPA review). 
18 See infra notes 95–111 and accompanying text. 
19 See Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 2–3; see also Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 Rev. 
Litig. 439, 462 (2010) (commenting on the tremendous power imbalance between corpo-
rations and the DOJ). 
20 See Brief for the United States at 81, United States v. Kay (Kay II ), 513 F.3d 432 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-20604). 
21 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1235–37 (commenting on the government’s growing ten-
dency to enforce the FCPA despite existing internal compliance programs, even in situa-
tions in which a rogue employee acted alone or in which there is no evidence of company 
involvement); see also infra notes 105–111 (discussing the DOJ’s November 2012 Resource 
Guide and how its description of effective compliance fails to clarify the extent to which a 
business’s compliance will influence prosecutorial decisions). 
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and unexpected result: a significant drop in a corporation’s incentive to 
vigorously monitor its own compliance and conduct.22 
 This Note analyzes several proposed solutions that purport to re-
duce the ambiguity of the FCPA’s application and provide guidance to 
the companies trying to comply with statutory requirements.23 High-
lighting the disadvantages of these solutions and addressing the reasons 
why the DOJ’s Resource Guide is insufficient to resolve the problems 
caused by the statute’s ambiguity, this Note proposes a hybrid approach 
that would provide companies with guidance and incentive to comply 
both pre- and post-indictment.24 This hybrid approach would combine 
the features of statutory protection with modifications to the enforce-
ment procedures.25 The proposed solution involves introduction of 
statutory compliance defense and enhancement of DOJ leniency pol-
icy.26 
 Part I of this Note establishes the relevant statutory background 
and discusses the regulatory framework of the FCPA.27 Part II argues 
against strict corporate vicarious liability, discusses the substantial bur-
dens imposed by the statute, and evaluates the unexpected effects of 
the broad interpretation of the FCPA on international business prac-
tices.28 Part III analyzes proposed solutions to resolve the ambiguity 
and to make compliance feasible and economically viable, advocating 
for a hybrid approach that would provide corporations with better pro-
tection at all stages of the FCPA compliance and investigation process.29 
                                                                                                                     
I. The FCPA’s Regulatory Framework and Its  
Expanding Application 
 This Part provides an overview of the FCPA’s legislative back-
ground and reviews key provisions of the statute.30 It also documents 
the historic trend of expansion of the FCPA’s application both through 
legislative changes and judicial interpretation.31 
 
22 See infra notes 130–138 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 194–238 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 239–253, 121–130, 221–226, 233–238 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 194–253 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 194–253 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 30–111 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 112–193 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 194–253 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 32–46, 75–103 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 41–43, 61–65 and accompanying text. 
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A. The FCPA: Purpose, Legislative History, and Enforcement 
 The FCPA outlaws corporate bribery of foreign officials.32 The stat-
ute establishes criminal and civil liability for bribery of foreign officials 
and contains two primary sets of provisions: accounting provisions and 
anti-bribery provisions.33 The accounting provisions require a corpora-
tion to keep records that accurately and fairly reflect its transactions and 
to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.34 The 
anti-bribery provisions, which are the focus of this Note, prohibit cor-
rupt payments to foreign officials made to obtain or retain business.35 
 Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 amid controversial allegations 
(and voluntary admissions) that major U.S. corporations, including 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Gulf Corporation, and Exxon Corpo-
ration, made questionable payments to foreign government officials.36 
Further inquiry suggested that foreign bribery was widespread, and in 
1977 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a report in 
which more than 400 U.S. companies, including 177 ranked in the For-
tune 500, voluntarily disclosed over $300 million in payments to over-
seas government officials.37 These companies included: Gulf Oil Cor-
poration, which admitted to paying a four million dollar bribe in South 
Korea; Exxon Corporation, which admitted to bribes in fifteen coun-
tries; and Lockheed Aircraft, the largest U.S. defense contractor, whose 
“enormous pattern of bribery” included the Japanese prime minister, a 
Dutch prince, and the president of Italy, among others.38 
 Widespread reports that corporate bribery was rampant prompted 
Congress to unanimously enact the FCPA to stop bribery of foreign offi-
cials and “to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
33 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1–dd-3 (2006); see also Thomas, supra note 19, at 444 
(discussing the two prongs of the FCPA provisions). 
34  See, supra note 5, at 2. 
35 See id. 
36 See Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at 5, United States v. Carson, No. 
SACR 09-00077 JVS (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) [hereinafter Koehler Declaration]. 
37 See Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 Am. 
J. Comp. L. Supp. 593, 595 (2002); Aaron Einhorn, Note, The Evolution and Endpoint of Re-
sponsibility: The FCPA, SOX, Socialist-Oriented Governments, Gratuitous Promises, and a Novel 
CSR Code, 35 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 509, 513 (2007). The alleged abuses ranged from 
direct bribes paid to foreign officials to “facilitating payments” made to expedite everyday 
bureaucratic duties. See Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing Busi-
ness in China, 25 Wis. Int’l L.J. 397, 400 n.9 (2007). 
38 See Schroth, supra note 37, at 595. 
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business system.”39 Although not illegal at the time under U.S. law, these 
corporate bribes to foreign governments were considered a serious for-
eign policy problem, tarnishing the image of U.S. democracy and 
threatening the praised free market system.40 Congress considered ces-
sation of foreign corporate bribery as not only a business regulation, but 
also an important matter of national policy.41 During the statute’s draft-
ing, the Senate reportedly focused on the effects of corporate bribery 
on foreign relationships, stressing the importance of the stability of 
overseas businesses.42 Amendments in 1988 and 1998 expanded the 
scope of the statute, suggesting that the FCPA’s expansive reach is inten-
tional and supporting a broad interpretation of the FCPA’s provisions.43 
 Two government agencies are responsible for enforcement of the 
FCPA: the DOJ, as the chief enforcement agency, and the SEC.44 The 
SEC has authority only for civil enforcement, and may only regulate 
those corporations—whether domestic or foreign—that issue securities 
registered in the United States or are otherwise required to file peri-
odic reports with the SEC.45 The DOJ is in charge of all criminal en-
forcement of the FCPA as well as civil enforcement of the anti-bribery 
provisions against non-issuers.46 
                                                                                                                      
39 See United States v. Kay (Kay I ), 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004); S. Rep. No. 95-
114, at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101; Koehler Declaration, supra 
note 36, at 11; John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the 
Increasing Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 Bus. Law. 135, 137 (2005); Lay-Person’s Guide, supra 
note 5, at 1–2. 
40 See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3–4. 
41 See id. at 10. 
42 See id. at 3–4. As a result, the statute provides for liability for indirect acts of bribery, 
such as those perpetrated by agents or third parties. H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4126 (stating that “the conferees intend to 
make clear that any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign officials 
indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be liable under the bill”). 
43 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998), 1998 WL 438894; Mike Koehler, The Fa-
cade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 907, 913 (2010). The 1988 amendment added 
some limited exceptions and narrow affirmative defenses to the FCPA, and substantially 
expanded the statute’s scope and jurisdiction. See Brown, supra note 7, at 240; Thomas, 
supra note 19, at 446–47. 
44 See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 1. 
45 See id.; see also Koehler, supra note 43, at 924 (highlighting the limits of the SEC’s en-
forcement authority). 
46 See Koehler, supra note 43, at 924; Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 2. 
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B. Who Is Implicated: Broad Reach of the FCPA Anti-Bribery Provisions 
1. Domestic and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
 The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA make it a crime to bribe 
foreign government officials to obtain or retain business.47 Although it 
is a domestic criminal law, the FCPA has vast extraterritorial application 
and concerns events that involve foreign nationals in foreign countries 
who frequently have only attenuated relationships to the United 
States.48 The jurisdiction of the anti-bribery provisions is remarkably 
expansive and encompasses both corporate entities and individuals.49 
                                                                                                                     
 The FCPA applies to “issuers,” “domestic concerns,” and any “oth-
er person” who, while within U.S. territory, performs an act in further-
ance of prohibited payment.50 Physical presence of the bribing party on 
U.S. territory is not required.51 Thus, the bribe itself does not have to 
take place within U.S. territory as long as some action leading to the 
eventual payment of the bribe occurred in the United States.52 This 
provision extends the FCPA’s reach to any foreign conduct when as lit-
tle as a phone call or email can be traced back to U.S. territory, making 
virtually any corporation a potential target of the FCPA.53 
 
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3 (2006). Payments made to a person who 
is not a foreign official are also illegal when such payments are made with knowledge that 
a portion of those payments will be offered, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official. See 
id. § 78dd-1(a)(3). 
48 See Donald Zarin, Doing Business Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
1–2 (1995). 
49 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). 
50 See id.; see also Koehler, supra note 43, at 913–14 (citing and analyzing the language 
of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions); Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3 (defining the 
terms “issuer” and “domestic concern”). The definition of “issuers” includes foreign and 
domestic corporations that issue securities registered in the United States or that are oth-
erwise required to file periodic reports with the SEC. See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 
3. “Domestic concern” includes U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents, as well as any incor-
porated or unincorporated business entities that have their principal place of business in 
the United States or are organized under U.S. law. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1). Provisions 
referring to any “other person” apply to any foreign national and any business, including 
sole proprietorships, organized under foreign law, as long as the act was committed in 
furtherance of prohibited conduct that occurred in U.S. territory. See id. § 78dd-3(f)(1). 
51 See Marie M. Dalton, Note, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 583, 602 (2006). 
52 See Schroth, supra note 37, at 603. 
53 See Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3; see also Christopher J. Duncan, The 1998 For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 Asian-Pac. L. 
& Pol’y J. 16, 38 (2000) (noting that a payment by an Indonesian businessman to an In-
donesian government official would fall under FCPA jurisdiction if the payment was au-
thorized using a U.S. cell phone provider). 
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 The vast jurisdictional reach of the FCPA is based on both nation-
ality and territoriality principles.54 The nationality principle is based 
exclusively on the nationality of the company or person paying the 
bribe and thus provides the DOJ with jurisdiction over illicit payments 
made by any U.S. company or citizen.55 Under this principle, the DOJ 
will have jurisdiction even if the corrupt payment was made outside the 
United States and without any use of an “instrumentality of interstate 
commerce.”56 Under the territoriality principle, the DOJ has jurisdic-
tion over any illicit action taken within the territory of the United States 
using any means or “instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”57 A tel-
ephone call, a fax transmission, or a wire transfer using a U.S. bank ac-
count all lay a sufficient basis to create territorial jurisdiction.58 Under 
this type of jurisdiction, the FCPA can reach any foreign national or 
company that performs any act in furtherance of a prohibited payment 
within the United States.59  A foreign company can be charged with an 
FCPA violation based merely on the fact that a U.S. bank account was 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Brown, supra note 7, at 278–79. 
55 See id.; see also Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3 (providing further information on 
liability imposed based on the nationality principle). 
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1(g) (extending the FCPA’s alternative jurisdiction to any U.S. 
national for any corrupt act that takes place outside the United States irrespective of 
whether any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce were used); see also Tho-
mas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis, 40 Cornell Int’l L.J. 691, 702 (2007) (noting that the FCPA provi-
sions can reach acts that take place entirely in foreign jurisdictions even when no instru-
mentality of interstate commerce is employed). For example, under the nationality princi-
ple of jurisdiction, a U.S. company may be held liable for a corrupt payment authorized by 
its non-U.S. employees or agents operating entirely outside the United States, using money 
from foreign bank accounts, and without any involvement by personnel located within the 
United States. See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3; see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2–3 
(1998), 1998 WL 438894 (proposing an amendment to the statute to include nationality 
jurisdiction, and noting that the FCPA now extends to the acts of U.S. businesses and citi-
zens made in furtherance of bribes even when the bribes take place entirely outside of the 
United States). The Senate report accompanying the 1998 amendment further noted that 
the exercise of nationality jurisdiction over unlawful conduct is “consistent with U.S. legal 
and constitutional principles.” S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2–3. 
57 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3; see also Brown, supra note 7, at 278–79 (noting 
that territorial jurisdiction is one of the most common bases for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, and citing the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
convention that territorial jurisdiction can be so broadly interpreted that no substantial 
physical link to the corrupt act is needed). 
58 See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3. 
59 See id. 
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used to transfer payment between a foreign executive and a foreign 
government official.60 
 The most recent amendment to the FCPA in 1998 solidified the 
statute’s broad reach and significantly expanded its scope and jurisdic-
tion.61 This amendment extended application of the FCPA to foreign 
companies and nationals that violate FCPA provisions while within the 
United States.62 The amended statute now applies to foreigners who 
may not have been physically present in the United States as long as 
there is a nexus between the activity in the United States and the fur-
therance of the prohibited payments.63 The 1998 amendment also 
greatly extended the application of nationality-based jurisdiction to acts 
committed by U.S. nationals outside the United States, and removed 
the earlier requirements that mail or interstate commerce had to be 
utilized by the offender.64 This amendment also extended the substan-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Paul R. Berger et al., Is That a Bribe?, 26 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 76, 76 (2007). In one 
case, for example, a French citizen who did not reside in the United States was charged 
with an FCPA violation for authorizing bribes to Costa Rican officials on behalf of his 
French employer, Alcatel, from his Paris office. Id. The jurisdictional basis for the FCPA 
indictment was the use of New York and Florida bank accounts. Id. To fall under the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the FCPA, it is sufficient for a company (or its agent) to merely con-
tact the United States with a phone call or e-mail made in furtherance of corrupt payment. 
See Zack Harmon, Confronting the New Challenges of FCPA Compliance: Recent Trends in FCPA 
Enforcement and Practical Guidance for Meeting These Challenges, in Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act Compliance Issues 51 (2010). 
61 See Brown, supra note 7, at 240. The ongoing expansion of the FCPA’s application is 
even clearer when it is viewed in the context of the global fight against corruption. See 
Sesto E. Vecchi & Kevin C. Chua, The War Against Corruption Goes International, J. Int’l 
Tax., Mar. 2001, at 8, 46; see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2–3 (discussing the expansion of 
the FCPA’s coverage and noting that such expansion is “essential” to the protection of the 
United States’ foreign interests). The 1998 amendment, for example, was implemented to 
incorporate the very broad provisions of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions that were passed by the OECD and 
ratified by the United States. See Kay I, 359 F.3d at 753–54. 
62 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3; see also Brown, supra note 7, at 291–92 (noting that 
during the original enactment of the FCPA in 1977 and the earlier amendments in 1988, 
Congress abstained from extending jurisdiction over non-U.S. individuals and entities). 
63 See Brown, supra note 7, at 303, 317. The jurisdictional reach of the amended FCPA ex-
tends virtually to any contact with the United States as long as it can be interpreted to further 
the FCPA violation. See id. The sufficient conduct might be a mere telephone call to the 
United States, a letter mailed to the United States, the use of air or road travel, or the clear-
ing of a check or wire transfer of funds through a financial institution in the United States. 
See id. 
64 See Brown, supra note 7, at 288–89 (noting that under the 1998 amendment, a “nex-
us” with the United States is no longer required); Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 3; see 
also Einhorn, supra note 37, at 518–19 (discussing the 1998 amendment and noting that it 
expanded the jurisdiction and substance of the FCPA provisions). 
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tive reach of the FCPA by broadening the definitions for some of the 
statutory terms.65 
2. Strict Liability and the FCPA’s Anti-Bribery Provisions 
 The FCPA is both a criminal and civil statute, and when applied in 
criminal proceedings by the DOJ, it requires adequate proof of in-
tent.66 Additionally, the conduct must be willful and corrupt.67 Fur-
thermore, when applied to actions of third parties, such as agents, con-
sultants, or distributors, an additional knowledge element must be met 
before vicarious liability can be imposed on the parent company.68 
                                                                                                                     
 The safeguard afforded by the extra knowledge requirement, how-
ever, has been broadly interpreted.69 A company is presumed to be re-
sponsible for the actions of its employees, regardless of their rank, as 
well as its third-party agents, regardless of whether such agents act on 
their own or under the company’s authorization.70 Establishing that a 
defendant perceived a high probability that a violation would occur is suf-
ficient to fulfill the knowledge requirement; there is no requirement of 
 
65 See Einhorn, supra note 37, at 518–19. The 1998 amendment broadened the defini-
tion of “foreign official” to include employees of international organizations. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006); see also Brown, supra note 7, 
at 288 (discussing the expansion of the term “foreign official”). It also widened the scope 
of the FCPA by adding “improper advantage” to the initial list of “abuses of discretion” 
prohibited by the statute. See Kay I, 359 F.3d at 754. As a result, the statute now proscribes 
not only bribes to foreign officials aimed at buying any “act or decision,” but also payments 
that secure elusive improper advantages that would assist in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness. See id. Courts broadly interpreted the term “improper advantage” to include pay-
ments made to the foreign officials to reduce business taxes or custom fees. See id. 
66 See Kay I, 359 F.3d at 960. 
67 See Kay II, 513 F.3d at 439–40; see also United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 
395 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (suggesting, however, that if the payments were extorted, the defen-
dant might show that he lacked the required corrupt intent). The legislative history of the 
FCPA indicates that “true extortion” is not covered by FCPA provisions and suggests that 
Congress distinguished between payments demanded by foreign officials as a price for 
gaining entry into the market and those made to “keep an oil rig from being dynamited.” 
See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. 
68 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd(f)(2)(B) (requiring knowledge of the existence 
of particular circumstances and stating that knowledge is established when a person is 
“aware of a high probability” of such circumstances). 
69 See Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 385–86 (stating that a violation exists when “the evi-
dence is such that a rational juror may reach the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously 
avoided confirming that fact”). 
70 See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and Its Im-
pact on International Business Transactions—Should Anything Be Done to Min-
imize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore 
Corruption? 4 (2011) [hereinafter IBTC Report]. 
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specific knowledge of an FCPA violation.71 In addition, willful ignorance 
is not a defense and is sufficient to satisfy the FCPA knowledge require-
ment.72 For example, in 2009, in United States v. Kozeny, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found the knowledge re-
quirement met, and therefore an FCPA violation, where the defendant 
was aware of a high probability that the payments made to Azeri officials 
to encourage privatization of a state-owned oil company were illegal yet 
deliberately avoided confirming this fact.73 Revealingly, during sentenc-
ing, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin acknowledged the uncertainty caused by 
the statute’s vague knowledge requirement, noting that after presiding 
over this case for years, she was still not entirely sure whether one of the 
defendants was “a victim or a crook or a little bit of both.”74 
C. What Conduct Is Implicated: Remaining Ambiguity and Uncertainty  
of the FCPA’s Scope 
 Academics and practitioners alike continuously voice concerns 
that the FCPA’s definitions are overly-broad and vague.75  Many critics 
                                                                                                                      
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3); Kay II, 513 F.3d at 449–50. Specifically, the statute ref-
erences the “conscious avoidance doctrine” in describing the knowledge requirement, 
noting that “when knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for 
an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the 
existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance 
does not exist.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B). 
72 See Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative Reform in the 
United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
365, 378 (2011); see also Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 385–86 (discussing the conscious avoid-
ance doctrine). 
73 See 664 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. The charges against one of the defendants, Bourke, 
made no reference to actual payment of bribes; instead, the defendant was charged with 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA by investing in a consortium that made illegal payments. See 
Richard Craig Smith et al., High Profile Conviction Likely to Further Bolster FCPA Enforcement, 
Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. ( July 13, 2009), http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?FUSE 
ACTION=publications.detail&NEWPAGE=0&PUB_ID=4011&SITE_ID=494&pf=y. The 
Kozeny court considered evidence that the defendant knew corruption was rampant in the 
country of investment and that his co-defendant was involved in some prior misconduct 
abroad as ample proof of the defendant’s knowledge of corrupt payments. See Kozeny, 664 
F. Supp. 2d at 386. 
74 David Glovin, Bourke Gets One Year in Prison in Azerbaijan Bribery Case, Bloomberg (Nov. 
11, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= a76j6PK3anAc. 
75 See, e.g., Kay I, 359 F.3d at 753–54; Doty, supra note 11, at 1239 (noting that “vague-
ness and ambiguity are the DNA of the FCPA”); Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Note, Ambiguities in 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 La. L. Rev. 861, 
871, 881 (2001) (arguing that the statute is weakened by the “critical” ambiguity of some of 
its provisions); see also Arthur Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in 
Public Office, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 214, 214 (1954) (noting that although laws protect against 
particular offenses, they are inadequate to deal with corruption, a “monster with not only 
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claim that the FCPA is “laden with subjective judgment” and has ambi-
guity coded into its very DNA.76 The current version of the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions has seven broad elements.77 These broad terms and 
the dearth of judicial interpretation create substantial uncertainty as to 
what constitutes a bribe under the FCPA.78 Not surprisingly, nearly eve-
ry corporate enforcement action under the FCPA in the last twenty 
                                                                                                                      
as many heads as Hydra, but as many shapes as Proteus; the legislature no sooner isolates 
and prohibits one form of official pocket-lining than another is devised”). In 2004, in Unit-
ed States v. Kay (Kay I ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the ordi-
nary meaning of the statutory language is “genuinely debatable and thus ambiguous.” 359 
F.3d at 744. 
76 Doty, supra note 11, at 1239; see also Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: 
What Is to Be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 431, 438 
(1987) (commenting on the “inherent ambiguity” of the FCPA); Charles B. Weinograd, 
Note, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine 
Governmental Action Exception, 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 509, 514–15 (2010) (remarking that FCPA 
provisions are “riddled with vagueness”). 
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006). The FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions make it a crime to: 
(1) willfully; (2) make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce; (3) corruptly; (4) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise 
to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; (5) any foreign offi-
cial; (6) for purposes of [either] influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official in his official capacity [or] inducing such foreign official to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official [or] securing any 
improper advantage; (7) in order to assist such [corporation] in obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. 
Kay II, 513 F.3d at 439–40 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a)). 
78 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Re-
surgence, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 389, 413 (2010) (commenting on the lack of official, useful guid-
ance); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expan-
sion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 489, 497 (2011) (commenting on the 
lack of judicial, administrative, and legislative guidance); Bonneau, supra note 72, at 378–79. 
The scarcity of case law flows from the very nature of the statute, which until recently pri-
marily targeted corporations. See Timothy P. O’Toole & Andrew Wise, You Mean You’re Really 
Going to Try an FCPA Case? A Checklist of Defenses for Practitioners Handling Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Cases, Champion, Sept. 2001, at 26, 26; see also Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 425, 434 (2009) (noting that between 1978 and 2000, there was an average of three 
prosecutions a year, and most cases that ended up in trial were resolved with little, if any, pen-
alty); Jeffrey S. Johnston et al., Executives and Directors in the Crosshairs: FCPA Investigations Target 
Individuals, EthiSphere ( Jan. 24, 2012), http://anticorruption.ethisphere. com/executives- 
and-directors-in-the-crosshairs-fcpa-investigations-target-individuals (noting that the DOJ his-
torically focused on companies as FCPA violators, but has recently started enforcement against 
individuals, likely because corporate fines fail to punish those who are actually responsible for 
the violations). 
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years has been resolved before trial.79 As such, some critics have sug-
gested that in practice, the FCPA’s provisions frequently mean simply 
what enforcement agencies want them to mean.80 
 The long-awaited Resource Guide issued by the DOJ in November 
2012 fails to clarify the FCPA’s ambiguous terms.81 Although some have 
praised the guidance as a comprehensive and useful tool for practitio-
ners, critics have noted that the report mostly compiles previously avail-
able information and does not add clarity to the statute’s broadly de-
fined terms.82 In addition, one commentator has claimed that some of 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Koehler, supra note 43, at 932. Most FCPA enforcement actions are resolved 
through settlements and non-prosecution or deferred-prosecution agreements. See id. at 
909. In addition, a number of actions have been resolved through private negotiations 
even before the alleged violators have been indicted. See id. at 910. 
80 See A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 1, at 68 (noting that, given the lack of guidance and 
judicial oversight, the FCPA provisions mean whatever the “aggressive prosecutor says [they 
do]”); see also Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New 
Era, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 99, 108 (2011) (arguing that the DOJ continued to push the limit 
with its enforcement theories in the absence of meaningful judicial oversight and operating 
against willing and cooperating defendants); Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the 
FCPA, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 781, 825 (2011) (contending that the DOJ, emboldened by 
companies’ desire to settle, has tended to advance ambiguous and overly broad interpreta-
tions of the FCPA that “rarely, if ever, receive judicial scrutiny”). 
81 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 963, 967 (arguing that the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement poli-
cies remain obscure despite the Resource Guide and noting that the DOJ’s interpretation of key 
statutory terms is misleading); Edward J. Fuhr, FCPA “Resource Guide” Released by SEC and DOJ 
Consistent with Previous Guidance, Hunton & Williams, 1 (2012), http://www.hunton.com/ 
files/News/e31606a8-44f6-48fe-9658-97e2e3dfa2b2/Presentation/NewsAttachment/db0355 
ca-a117-4461-b6a5-9b414ef5a52f/FCPA_Resource_Guide_Released.pdf; Dwight Holton, DOJ 
and the SEC to U.S. Business: We Expect Action on Effective Compliance Programs, Lane Powell 
D&O Discourse (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2012/11/16/doj-and-
the-sec-to-u-s-business-we-expect-action-on-effective-compliance-programs (noting the re-
maining ambiguity); Palazzolo, supra note 14 (lamenting that the Resource Guide does not 
provide “firm policy pronouncements”). 
82 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 963–66; Rosenberg, supra note 14. Indeed, the Resource 
Guide itself notes that most of the terms are broadly interpreted and that although it provides 
some extreme examples of what constitutes a bribe and what does not, it fails to alleviate the 
uncertainty for conduct in the middle of the spectrum. See Resource Guide, supra note 12, 
at 14–23; see also Lindsey Lawyer ‘Underwhelmed’ by New Guidance, FCPA Blog, http://www.fcpa 
blog.com/blog/2012/11/14/lindsey-lawyer-underwhelmed-by-new-guidance. html (Nov. 14, 
2012, 1:53 PM) (quoting Jan Handzlik, a white collar defense attorney, who argued that the 
new report simply restates publicly available information while providing “little guidance” or 
clarity); James McGrath, Little Things Mean a Lot: The FCPA Guide on Internal Investigations, 
Internal Investigations Blog (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.mcgrathgrace.com/internal-
investigations-blog/little-things-mean-a-lot-the-fcpa-guide-on-internal-investigations.html 
(noting that the Resource Guide contained nothing “unanticipated or otherwise new”); Roger 
M. Witten et al., DOJ and the SEC Issue Much-Anticipated FCPA Guidance, WilmerHale, 1, 9 (Nov. 
19, 2012), http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/DOJ%20and%20the%20SEC%20Issue 
%20Much-Anticipated%20FCPA%20Guidance.pdf (noting that the guidance fails to resolve 
ambiguity in “some of the more controversial aspects” of the enforcement process). 
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the Resource Guide’s explanations are incomplete, and at times plainly 
false, reflecting the prosecutors’ beliefs instead of current case law.83 
 For example, the term “anything of value” is not defined in the 
FCPA, and historically DOJ interpretations have included everything 
from cash-stuffed briefcases to charitable donations and executive 
training programs at U.S. universities.84 The November 2012 Resource 
Guide confirms that the term should be broadly interpreted, and al-
though it dedicates several examples to charitable contributions, it 
stops before suggesting specific factors to be considered in making the 
decision.85 There is no de minimis value associated with the “anything 
of value” element, and prosecutors frequently take into consideration a 
recipient’s perception of value.86 By using subjective valuation of the con-
veyed benefit, they wade into the highly unpredictable minefield of cul-
tural differences, and the newly issued DOJ guidance provides no sub-
stantive new information to navigate the term’s ambiguity.87 
 Similarly, many commentators stress the vagueness of the key term 
“foreign official.”88 The FCPA defines “foreign official” as any officer or 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 964–65 (arguing that the guidance contains “demon-
stratively false” statements that have been previously rejected by courts). Professor Mike 
Koehler has identified several examples of what he considers “disturbing” and incomplete 
interpretations, involving the DOJ’s explanations of terms like “foreign official” and “ob-
tain or retain business.” See id. at 964–66. 
84 See Koehler, supra note 43, at 914–15; see also Dalton, supra note 51, at 597–98 (not-
ing that courts have interpreted the term “anything of value” under the FCPA and other 
federal statutes to include witness testimony, promises of future employment, and the host-
ing of golf gatherings). In 2004, for example, SEC prosecutors argued that donations 
made by Schering-Plough Corporation to a Polish charitable organization constituted a 
prohibited “thing of value” because the charity’s director enjoyed the increased success of 
his charity, even though he never received any direct monetary payments. See Kovacich, 
supra note 17, at 539. The SEC and Schering-Plough settled the action without litigation. 
Id. at 539 n.64; see also Koehler, supra note 43, at 915 (noting that although the dispute 
between the SEC and Schering-Plough was ultimately resolved on the basis of the FCPA’s 
accounting provisions, the lack of judicial scrutiny led this action to be “commonly viewed 
as broadening the ‘anything of value’ element of an FCPA anti-bribery violation” as well). 
85 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 14–16. 
86 See H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law. 260, 275 (1994) (commenting 
that the FCPA may concern any intangible item, the value of which is determined solely by 
the perception of the recipient, and concluding that the item itself is not as important as 
the “corrupt intent with which the benefit is conferred”). 
87 See Brown, supra note 86, at 275; Bonneau, supra note 72, at 378; T. Markus Funk et 
al., New FCPA Guidance: No Sea Change but a Helpful Enforcement Summary, FCPA Blog, (Nov. 
19, 2012, 5:40 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/19/new-fcpa-guidance-no-
sea-change-but-a-helpful-enforcement-su.html. 
88 See Koehler, supra note 43, at 916; see also Zarin, supra note 48, at 4–17 (arguing that 
the term “foreign official” remains unclear); Bonneau, supra note 72, at 398 (noting the 
widespread criticism that the definition of “foreign official” is “unduly vague”). 
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employee of a foreign government or its instrumentality.89 As a result of 
the statute’s broad terms, there is an ongoing debate concerning 
whether a state-owned enterprise can be considered as such an instru-
mentality.90 The first judicial interpretations of the term surfaced in 
2011 and suggested that the definition can include employees of for-
eign state-owned enterprises, regardless of their rank.91 The November 
2012 Resource Guide restates from earlier court decisions the non-
exclusive list of eleven common law factors that companies should con-
sider in determining whether they are dealing with a foreign official, 
but provides no hypothetical examples or detailed guidance.92 Al-
though the Resource Guide suggests that generally an entity will not be 
considered a foreign government instrumentality unless a foreign gov-
ernment owns or controls a majority of its shares, it warns that in unde-
fined cases, an ownership stake of under fifty percent can trigger the 
“foreign official” definition.93 Thus, a question remains about the level 
of governmental ownership required to consider a business a state-
owned enterprise.94 
                                                                                                                      
89 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
90 See Koehler, supra note 80, at 117 (arguing that inclusion of employees of state-
owned entities under the definition of “foreign official” is contrary to Congress’s intent); 
see also Zarin, supra note 48, at 4–17 (noting the uncertain status of state-owned enter-
prises and the problems raised by the application of the statute to “quasi-governmental” 
bodies or state-owned enterprises undergoing privatization); Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the 
FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 Bus. Law. 1243, 1249–50 (2008) (commenting 
on the lack of guidance from the DOJ on what constitutes “instrumentalities” of foreign 
governments). 
91 See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3–4, *10 (noting that the FCPA does not define 
“instrumentality” but acknowledging that state-owned enterprises could theoretically be 
considered instrumentalities of foreign government by referring to the inquiry as a ques-
tion of fact); see also United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(holding that a state-owned enterprise may be an “instrumentality” of a foreign govern-
ment for FCPA purposes). 
92 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 19–21; Koehler, supra note 15, at 965–66. 
93 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 21. 
94 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20 (2011) [hereinafter FCPA 
Hearing] (testimony of Hon. Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen. of the United States, 
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton); see also Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (suggesting a list 
of non-exclusive factors for determining whether an enterprise qualifies as an instrumen-
tality under the statute, including whether key officers and directors are appointed by—or 
are themselves—government officials, and whether the entity is widely perceived to be 
performing governmental functions). 
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D. Statutory Exemptions and Affirmative Defenses 
 According to the 1988 amendment to the FCPA, certain payments 
are exempt from the FCPA’s reach; this statutory exemption, however, 
is very limited in scope.95 As a result of the amendment, the FCPA does 
not apply to “grease payments” —facilitating payments to a foreign offi-
cial made to expedite routine governmental action.96 
 The 1988 amendment also added two affirmative defenses for de-
fendants in FCPA enforcement actions.97 These defenses, however, are 
also narrowly tailored to apply in a limited and well-defined set of cir-
cumstances and impose few restrictions on the FCPA’s expansive 
reach.98 The first available defense provides that the statute does not 
apply if the payment was legal under the written laws of the foreign 
country.99 This is a narrow defense that applies only to actions expressly 
authorized under foreign law; failure of the foreign government to en-
force local anti-bribery laws, however, does not constitute a defense.100 
In addition, the FCPA does not apply to a “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure” directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or ex-
planation of products or services, or to the execution or performance 
of a contract with a foreign government or its agency.101 This defense is 
also narrowly construed and is usually limited to expenditures such as 
travel or lodging expenses.102 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 4. 
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b); Thomas, supra note 19, at 446 (discussing the “grease 
payments” exception under the 1988 amendment). Examples of acceptable routine gov-
ernmental actions include issuing permits or licenses, processing visas and other govern-
mental papers, providing police protection, and scheduling inspections associated with 
contract performance. See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 4. 
97 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 446–47. Unlike the statutory exemption for “grease 
payments,” which provides that the FCPA should not apply at all and thus no enforcement 
action can be initiated, the affirmative defenses provide some limited protection once an 
FCPA investigation has started and it is determined that the FCPA’s provisions apply. See 
id.; supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
98 See, e.g., Kay I, 359 F.3d at 756 (holding that Congress intentionally defined the 
FCPA’s affirmative defenses narrowly against the scope of the statute’s broad reach); Kyle 
P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 28 Wis. Int’l L.J. 464, 465–66 (2010) (commenting on the narrow scope of 
the affirmative defenses and arguing that the defenses are “virtually useless” in practice). 
99 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1). 
100 See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New 
International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 457, 461 (1998). 
101 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2). 
102 See id. § 78dd-2(c)(2); see also Sheahen, supra note 98, at 465–66 (noting the narrow 
scope of the FCPA defenses and arguing that the reasonable expenditure defense is illu-
sory at best). 
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 Notably, the current statute does not allow for a compliance de-
fense, and accordingly, having an internal anti-bribery policy is insuffi-
cient to safeguard a company from vicarious liability for the conduct of 
its employees.103 The DOJ’s internal procedures do, however, require it 
to consider the existence and effectiveness of a corporation’s pre-
existing compliance program before taking an enforcement action.104 
The November 2012 guidance contains a comprehensive description of 
an effective compliance program, and stresses the important role effec-
tive corporate compliance plays in the DOJ’s prosecutorial decisions.105 
The guidance lists many factors considered by the DOJ, but nevertheless 
warns that there are no “formulaic requirements” and that prosecutors 
will take a common sense approach in evaluating compliance pro-
grams.106 The lack of such requirements creates uncertainty for compa-
nies that seek to build compliance programs in good faith.107 In addi-
tion, a company’s reliance on the most comprehensive compliance pro-
gram is uncertain even after the issuance of the Resource Guide, since this 
guidance is nonbinding, and in the words of the DOJ itself, cannot be 
“relied upon to create any rights” and does not “limit any enforcement 
intentions.”108 
 To provide an incentive to comply and to ensure that companies 
are rewarded for their good-faith efforts, adding corporate compliance 
to the list of available affirmative defenses has been repeatedly sug-
                                                                                                                      
103 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1235–36; see also FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 19–20 
(noting that a company can be held liable for a violation committed by a rogue employee 
even if it has implemented a “state-of-the art” compliance program and makes good faith 
efforts to ensure compliance). Instead, vicarious liability is imposed regardless of the exis-
tence of a company policy prohibiting bribery or any employee training programs. See 
Doty, supra note 11, at 1235–36. 
104 See FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 11–12 (statement of Greg Anders, Acting Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen.). The DOJ argues that it “seriously considers” existing compliance and 
bribery-prevention programs in its indictment decisions and that it does not pursue compa-
nies because of the actions of a sole “rogue employee”; this internal policy, however, can 
change at any time and has yet to be tested in the courts. See FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 
19; Former DOJ FCPA Chief Supports FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA Professor (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-doj-fcpa-chief-supports-fcpa-compliance-defense; 
House Hearing—Overview and Observations, FCPA Professor ( June 14, 2011), http://www.fcpa 
professor.com/house-hearing-overview-and-observations. 
105 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 53–62. 
106 See id. at 56. 
107 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 968 (arguing that the DOJ’s current position on tak-
ing existing compliance programs into account is not working); Rubenfeld et al., supra 
note 14 (quoting practitioners saying that guidance cannot provide the same certainty as a 
structural change to the statute and complaining that the guidance failed to formulate a 
comprehensive policy). 
108 Resource Guide, supra note 12, at aii. 
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gested to legislators even after the issuance of the November 2012 Re-
source Guide.109 It has been argued that current position of the DOJ 
guidelines—that proper compliance might lessen the punishment— 
lacks the specificity and precision necessary for it to impact business de-
cisions.110 Armed with broad recommendations of best practices, in-
stead of firm guarantees, the only way for businesses to even test the ap-
propriateness of their compliance programs is to wait and see whether a 
charge will be brought—a risk few businesses are willing to take.111 
II. Impact on Business Practices: Corporate Victims of the FCPA 
 This Note argues that the absence of legislative, judicial, or admin-
istrative guidance on how to comply with ambiguous statutory terms 
results in a host of direct and indirect costs to businesses and unneces-
sarily burdens corporations, leading to the loss of competitive edge and 
abandonment of business opportunities.112 Most corporations are eager 
to comply with the FCPA’s provisions but are unable to do so because 
of the ambiguity and unpredictability of enforcement.113 This Note fur-
ther argues that in addition to the unnecessary and detrimental burden 
                                                                                                                      
109 See FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 23–26. This affirmative defense would allow 
companies to defend themselves against the imposition of criminal liability for the viola-
tions of their employees or contractors who acted on their own and circumvented meas-
ures that were in place to identify and prevent violations. Id. at 3; Koehler, supra note 15, at 
968. Proponents of the compliance defense point out that anti-corruption legislation in 
other jurisdictions, particularly in the United Kingdom, does provide for adequate com-
pliance as an affirmative defense. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (Eng.). Specifically, 
the UK Bribery Act, the “latest word” in the global fight against corruption, which went 
into effect in July 2011, provides for an adequate compliance defense when a company 
establishes and strictly enforces effective procedures. See id. Some commentators argue 
that the availability of a compliance defense minimizes “crippling probe[s] into an other-
wise blameless company.” See Koehler, supra note 80, at 108; Thomas, supra note 19, at 462; 
A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 1, at 68. Others counter that unlike the UK Bribery Act, 
which imposes strict liability for corporations that fail to prevent bribery, the FCPA only 
criminalizes actual or constructive knowledge of corruption and thus sufficient protection 
for good-faith actors is already built into the statute. See Bonneau, supra note 72, at 400; A 
Tale of Two Laws, supra note 1, at 68. 
110 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 968; DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Jones Day Summary and Analysis, Jones Day (Dec. 2012), http://www.jonesday. 
com/doj_sec_resource_guide_to_fcpa. 
111 See infra notes 224–226 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 117–193 and accompanying text. 
113 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1255 (noting that most U.S. businesses have “genuine 
confusion” about current FCPA requirements). As a result, harsh enforcement of ambigu-
ous rules and lack of leniency toward those companies that do engage in good faith com-
pliance provides little incentive for costly monitoring and might actually dissuade compli-
ance. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
Legal Stud. 833, 835–36 (1994). 
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on the companies themselves, current enforcement negatively affects 
the U.S. economy as a whole and chills international investment.114 
 This Part first discusses the challenges faced by companies that 
seek to comply with the statutory requirements and notes that lack of 
guidance can lead to decrease in compliance and self-reporting.115 It 
then analyzes the options open to the companies investigated for FCPA 
violations and discusses the direct and indirect costs of these options.116 
A. Catch-22: Preemptive Compliance in the Vacuum of Guidance 
 Most U.S. businesses are eager to comply, but even the published 
guides on FCPA compliance note the difficulties in prescribing a rec-
ommended course of action due to the statute’s ambiguous nature.117 
The DOJ’s newly issued Resource Guide addresses effective compliance 
practices, but lacks specificity and does not make any substantive clari-
fications or changes.118 The lack of guidance and a good-faith compli-
ance defense is problematic because it prevents corporations from 
making informed business decisions and can lead to unexpected and 
undesired results.119 
 Even in the 1980s, well before the drastic expansion of the statute, 
Congress held hearings during which members of the business com-
munity testified that the FCPA’s vague standards were hurting U.S. 
businesses and creating avoidable and unnecessary compliance costs.120 
                                                                                                                      
114 See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra notes 117–138 and accompanying text. 
116 See infra notes 139–193 and accompanying text. 
117 See Taylor, supra note 75, at 878–79. 
118 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 968; DOJ and SEC Publish Extensive Guidance on FCPA 
Compliance, Fed. Contractor Compliance Watch (Dec. 5, 2012, 10:51 AM), http://federal 
contractorcompliancewatch.com/2012/12/05/doj-and-sec-publish-extensive-guidance-on-
fcpa-compliance; McGrath, supra note 82. 
119 See Arlen, supra note 113, at 836 (arguing that increased corporate liability might 
result in increased, not reduced, criminal activity); Rashna Bhojwani, Note, Deterring Global 
Bribery: Where Public and Private Enforcement Collide, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 66, 98 (2012) (con-
tending that the current statutory ambiguity can lead to reduced compliance and disclo-
sure); see also Allen R. Brooks, Note, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 
137, 154–55 (2010) (noting that informed decisions about business risks are instrumental 
to American entrepreneurship and arguing that statutory clarity is necessary to allow busi-
nesses to effectively evaluate their risk exposure and accurately consider all costs of com-
pliance). 
120 See, e.g., Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 430 
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) (Statement of Chairman John 
Heinz) (“Complaints from the American business community about the vague and confus-
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Today, the problem of uncertainty and unpredictability is exacerbated 
by the expansive interpretation and increased enforcement of the stat-
ute.121 There have been complaints that, to a large extent, the FCPA’s 
“bewildering text” means whatever the prosecutor wants it to mean.122 
Although the DOJ’s November 2012 guidance contains a list of useful 
practices that should be considered by companies in building effective 
compliance programs, critics have raised several concerns: the sugges-
tions are very broad in nature, are nonbinding, contain new, undefined 
elements that can be properly evaluated only with the benefit of hind-
sight, and are ambiguous because of their warning that implementa-
tion should vary from company to company.123 In addition, the new 
guidance fails to mitigate corporations’ uncertainty on how effective 
compliance will affect prosecutorial decisions, merely noting that effec-
tive compliance may be taken into consideration.124 
 Lacking concrete guidance from the DOJ, other than broad rec-
ommendations of “best practices,” and judicial interpretation of the 
statute, the companies that are trying to follow the rules in good faith 
are forced to take unsubstantiated guesses as to what is proper.125 These 
companies are left on their own without knowledge of what conduct 
would be prosecuted under the FCPA.126 This is a particularly costly 
                                                                                                                      
ing definitions and enforcement provisions in the FCPA have continued unabated since 
the FCPA became law in 1977. Billions of dollars of sales have been lost and continue to be 
lost because American businessmen have been convinced by their own Government that 
they should not aggressively pursue sales opportunities abroad.”); Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act—Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 2 (1981–1982) (Statement of Chairman Hon. Timothy E. 
Wirth) (“We are being told by business and trade groups that the act is a major disincen-
tive to exports and harmful to our national interests, our balance of trade, and our econ-
omy.”). 
121 See Bonneau, supra note 72, at 394–95. A broad and unpredictable interpretation of 
the knowledge requirement, for example, arguably imposes heavy burdens on companies 
and potentially chills legitimate business investment. See Nichols, supra note 10, at 287. 
122 See A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 1, at 68. 
123 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 968; Lindsey Lawyer “Underwhelmed” by New Guidance, 
supra note 82; McGrath, supra note 82; Alexandra Wrage, Share More. Spend Less. Reduce 
Risk., FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog (Nov. 16, 2012, 1:01 AM), http://tfoxlaw.word 
press.com/2012/11/16/share-more-spend-less-reduce-risk. 
124 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 54, 56; Koehler, supra note 15, at 968. 
125 FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 3–4 (opening statement by Rep. Robert C. Scott, 
Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.); see also Doty, 
supra note 11, at 1255 (discussing the “policy vacuum” in which FCPA interpretation is 
being developed and the genuine confusion of the companies unable to determine proper 
conduct from the ambiguous rules). 
126 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly 
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 489, 497 (2011). 
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method of trial and error; it is estimated that costs of preventive compli-
ance and related internal investigations range from two to twenty mil-
lion dollars.127 Although companies do receive some benefit for self-
reporting FCPA violations, it is still uncertain whether companies that 
make voluntary disclosures are necessarily better off.128 The example of 
Siemens, which paid over a billion dollars in internal investigation costs 
to assist in an anti-corruption investigation, is fresh in the minds of every 
business executive.129 The substantial costs of FCPA compliance and 
lack of guidance on how to comply lead to two opposite, but equally 
undesirable, results: (1) companies over comply by adopting costly and 
inefficient standards that nonetheless offer no immunity from DOJ 
prosecution, or (2) companies decline to develop anti-bribery policies, 
fearing that they will be liable for any infraction anyway.130 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition, the current regime of strict vicarious liability presents 
companies with conflicting and potentially perverse incentives: in-
creased compliance and self-reporting expenditures also increases the 
probability that the government will detect violations, thus increasing 
the expected criminal liability for misconduct.131 For example, a com-
pany might feel that spending a fortune on compliance and employee 
training is not a good investment if leniency provided by the DOJ for 
compliance is inadequate to compensate for the substantial costs of 
 
127 See Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition Trans-
actions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247, 278 (2010); see also 
Wrage, supra note 123 (arguing that the current trend of growing compliance costs is un-
sustainable, and, in addition to escalating spending, leads to “compliance fatigue and em-
ployee cynicism”). 
128 See Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of 
Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 153, 212–13 (2010); 
see also infra note 161 (discussing the Siemens settlement). 
129 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 213; see also infra notes 161–162 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Siemens case and the costs of internal investigation and 
compliance). 
130 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 8; Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–36 (noting that 
strict liability can create perverse incentives actually reducing compliance); Koehler, supra 
note 43, at 1001. 
131 See Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–36 (noting that studies of corporate behavior have 
suggested that if a company’s expected cost incurred by an increase in its expected crimi-
nal liability exceeds the expected benefit of the reduction in the number of violations, a 
company subject to strict vicarious liability will not respond by increasing its enforcement 
expenditures because additional compliance would only increase its expected criminal 
liability); see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 
964 (2009) (arguing that the application of strict corporate liability failed to deter viola-
tions ex ante because corporations lacked any incentive to detect and report improper 
behavior). 
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running a compliance program.132 The November 2012 Resource Guide 
did not allay the ambiguity, as it merely provided that prosecutors may 
take effective compliance into consideration.133 Facing the risks of a 
costly and lengthy trial, companies are pressured to settle, even if they 
have invested in the development and implementation of a thorough 
compliance program.134 
 As a result, a company might be deterred from reporting identified 
violators or might choose to forego compliance altogether, merely hop-
ing to avoid being caught.135 This, in turn, might lead more companies 
to lose trust in enforcement and ignore the law, knowing that they can 
be penalized whether or not they invest millions in compliance.136 Thus, 
exorbitant fines, coupled with the unpredictability of enforcement and 
a perceived lack of credit for attempted compliance, can lead to unde-
sired results: a reduction in compliance and the incentive to investigate 
purported misconduct or to report detected crimes.137 A perverse circu-
lar pattern is created. Even companies who want to comply with the 
FCPA and invest in internal compliance programs are typically held fully 
responsible for every violation; this result, in turn, diminishes compa-
nies’ incentive to strive for FCPA compliance or self-report violations.138 
B. Forced to Settle? Direct Costs of FCPA Enforcement 
 FCPA enforcement has sharply risen in recent years.139 Out of the 
ten largest FCPA settlements, only one occurred in 2008, and five, total-
                                                                                                                      
132 See Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–36; see also Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 6 
(stating that significant costs of investigation of any alleged violation are borne by the com-
pany without a guarantee that it will receive any “cooperation credit” from the government); 
Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 154 (noting that corporations governed by risk-neutral 
individuals might choose not to report a violation if self-reporting will result in an insubstan-
tial reduction in the penalty and the violation is unlikely to be independently detected by the 
DOJ). Siemens famously spent over one billion dollars on internal compliance, yet the dis-
count it received during settlement negotiations with the prosecutors was substantially small-
er than the costs it incurred. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 223–24. 
133 See Resource Guide, supra note 12, at 54, 56; Koehler, supra note 15, at 968. 
134 FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.). 
135 See Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–36; Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, 
FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 775, 819 (2011) (noting the chilling 
effect current trends in enforcement have on voluntary reporting of corrupt behavior); 
Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 155. 
136 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1235. 
137 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 154. 
138 See supra notes 117–137 and accompanying text. 
139 See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Settlements Can Become Costly Burdens, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 
2011, at B2. 
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ing over $1 billion, occurred in 2010.140 In 2011 alone, criminal fines 
exceeded $270 million, up from about $11 million in 2004.141 For a mul-
tinational business, the consequences of a DOJ indictment are enor-
mous, immediate, and potentially lethal.142 Due to the direct costs of a 
lengthy trial, costly discovery, and the harder-to-quantify indirect costs 
and risks of criminal indictment, corporations try to settle with the DOJ 
even when they believe the charges are exaggerated.143 The risk and 
cost of trial for corporate defendants are so high that companies make a 
business decision to minimize consequences and “innocence becomes 
an irrelevancy.”144 Thus, critics allege that concepts of innocence and 
guilt no longer determine judicial process in white collar crime cases, 
and that a company’s “choice” to settle is not a choice at all when con-
sidered in the context of the enormous costs associated with the deci-
sion to litigate.145 
 Given that most of the charges of FCPA violations are settled be-
fore trial with little or no judicial oversight, federal prosecutors com-
mand a substantial share of lawmaking power, and therefore have sig-
nificant leverage.146 In his written testimony to the U.S. House of Rep-
                                                                                                                      
140 Richard L. Cassin, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It’s 90% Non-U.S., FCPA Blog (Dec. 
29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-in-new-top-
ten-its-90-non-us.html; see also Richard L. Cassin, Corporate Enforcement Since 2006, FCPA Blog 
( Jan. 3, 2012, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/3/corporate-enforcement-
since-2006.html (noting that in 2007, fifteen companies paid $128 million in penalties and 
disgorgements, and comparing these numbers to twenty-three companies that paid $1.8 bil-
lion in fines and disgorgements in 2010). 
141 See Palazzolo, supra note 139. 
142 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 6. 
143 See id. 
144 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 87 (2010). 
145 See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agree-
ments, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1434, 1457 (2007); Podgor, supra note 144, at 87; see also Mike Koeh-
ler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 609, 658 (“Set-
tlements often have far more to do with the leverage the government enjoys than the merits 
of what the company did or didn’t do.” (quoting Stephen Jonas, a partner at Wilmer Hale 
and chair of the firm’s Investigations and Criminal Litigation Practice Group)). 
146 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1255 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal 
Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 479 (1996)); see also Koehler, supra note 43, at 932 
(commenting on the virtual absence of challenges to the DOJ’s aggressive interpretation 
of the statutory provisions); Paulsen, supra 145, at 1436, 1459 (Unable to risk a potential 
indictment, the corporation is thus left at the mercy of the prosecutor. . . . Without the 
threat of trial, however, there is no assurance that the prosecutor is acting in a judicious 
manner”). The lack of a compliance defense leaves companies at the mercy of federal 
prosecutors who may or may not take into account internal compliance programs. See 
FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 19–20 (raising the concern of “unlimited prosecutorial 
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resentatives, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey cautioned that 
by negotiating resolutions before an indictment or enforcement action 
is filed, the DOJ “effectively control[s] the disposition of the FCPA cases 
they initiate and impose[s] their own extremely broad interpretation of 
the FCPA’s key provisions.”147 As prosecutorial discretion remains large-
ly unchecked, the uncertainty of the FCPA provisions increases, and 
befuddled corporations are even more likely to settle.148 
 Direct costs of FCPA enforcement include litigation costs (for the 
few companies that dare to expose themselves to trial) and settlement 
costs.149 Settlements usually involve a combination of fines, penalties 
and stringent requirements for future compliance.150 The fines can be 
substantial, with statutory maximums for criminal penalties running up 
to two million dollars for each violation of the anti-bribery provision.151 
In addition, if criminally convicted of an FCPA violation, the company 
can be required to pay a fine constituting twice the gross gains or loss-
es.152 Despite the massive amounts involved, the settlement packages 
receive little, if any, judicial oversight and critics note that the cost of 
these settlements appears to escalate, with each new case merely estab-
lishing a new bottom line.153 
 Although settling with the DOJ helps corporations save time and 
money on lengthy trials, it is often just the start of a very long and very 
costly process.154 Most settlements impose stringent requirements for 
future compliance, under which the companies are required to revamp 
their compliance procedures and spend additional millions of dollars 
                                                                                                                      
discretion” and noting the lack of predictability about whether a corporate compliance 
program would result in more favorable terms during settlement). 
147 FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 22. Some critics go as far as arguing that currently 
there exists a policy vacuum in which the rules are created by federal prosecutors and are 
modified at will to fit the particular case. See Doty, supra note 11, at 1255. 
148 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 462 (discussing the “tremendous imbalance” of power 
between a prosecutor and defendant, and commenting on potential “large-scale prosecu-
torial abuse”); see also Koehler, supra note 43, at 938 (noting prosecutors’ unchecked pow-
er). Joseph Covington, a former DOJ FCPA Chief, observed that with the risks a company 
faces by taking a case to trial and without any real ability to contest liability, “too much 
power and discretion ends up in the hands of the government.” See Former DOJ FCPA Chief 
Supports FCPA Compliance Defense, supra note 104. 
149 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 3. 
150 See id. 
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (2006). 
152 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
153 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1237. 
154 See, e.g., IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 6 (noting the substantial costs incurred by 
lengthy trials and noting significant negative consequences of criminal indictment); Palaz-
zolo, supra note 139. 
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on updates, maintenance, and related legal fees.155 Many settlements 
also require installation of third-party compliance monitors, paid for by 
the company itself, who will police the company’s FCPA compliance 
provisions.156 
 Furthermore, ensuring continuous compliance substantially in-
creases a company’s pre-transactional and transactional costs.157 The 
former involve the increased costs of due diligence efforts and expen-
sive internal investigations of every allegation of prohibited conduct.158 
The latter account for substantial and recurring costs of post-trans-
actional integration: for example, the time and resources companies 
now spend on post-merger integration and implementation of different 
compliance programs.159 It has been suggested that the FCPA compo-
nent of compliance annually costs large multinational businesses tens of 
millions of dollars.160 The investigation of Siemens is a famous example 
of the staggering costs of compliance and due diligence.161 The internal 
investigation is estimated to have directly cost Siemens approximately $1 
billion, not including indirect costs of business disruptions to Siemens’ 
employees during this lengthy global inquiry.162 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Berger et al., supra note 60, at 78; Palazzolo, supra note 139. 
156 See Berger et al., supra note 60, at 78. Siemens, which settled with the DOJ in 2008, 
now employs over 500 full-time compliance personnel worldwide. See Sentencing Memo-
randum at 22, United States v. Siemens, No.1:08-CR-367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). In at least 
one settlement, the DOJ went as far as requiring that it be granted power to approve ap-
pointments of key company executives, including compliance counsel. See Berger et al., 
supra note 60, at 78. It is yet unclear how frequently such provisions will be used going 
forward and whether the DOJ will actually exercise its power to ban executive appoint-
ments, but the mere possibility of such pervasive and disruptive control over business deci-
sions by prosecutors is chilling. See id. 
157 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 1–2; see also Baer, supra note 131, at 949–50 (ex-
pressing doubts that improvements to corporate transparency by the corporate compli-
ance industry were proportionate to their costs). 
158 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 7, 9–10. 
159 See id. at 10. 
160 See id. 
161 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 213. Siemens engaged in extensive inter-
nal investigation which spanned thirty-four countries and involved over 1750 interviews 
and 800 informational meetings. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 156, at 2, 19. In 
its Sentencing Memorandum, the DOJ referred to the scope of the Siemens investigation 
as “unprecedented.” Id. Over 100 million documents were collected and preserved, and it 
was estimated that Siemens paid for over 1.5 million hours of billable time to over 100 
attorneys and 130 forensic accountants. See id. at 19. 
162 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 213. 
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C. Indirect Costs of FCPA Enforcement 
 In addition to the multi-million dollar monetary penalties and es-
calating compliance costs, criminal aspects of FCPA enforcement add a 
host of indirect costs, including reputational damages and the potential 
loss of future contracts or international opportunities.163 Collateral 
consequences of criminal conviction or indictment may be more devas-
tating than imposed fines.164 The damage to a company’s reputation 
and the loss of clients and future contracts can be fatal.165 In addition, 
companies named in FCPA investigations can lose profitable interna-
tional contracts, and government contractors can face suspension or 
disbarment.166 Even a hint of criminal involvement might lead to exclu-
sion of U.S. companies from international opportunities or even from 
doing business abroad.167 A company found guilty of violating the 
FCPA anti-bribery provisions may also be ruled ineligible to receive ex-
port licenses.168 
 Another collateral cost of increased FCPA enforcement and the 
lack of an adequate compliance defense is the dramatic decrease in the 
competitiveness of U.S. businesses abroad caused by escalating costs of 
doing business.169 The costs of doing business are substantially increas-
ing because now companies have to account for and overcome obsta-
cles that their international competitors—which are not subject to 
                                                                                                                      
163 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1237; see also Koehler, supra note 37, at 397 (discussing 
the harsh sanctions of FCPA enforcement and noting the damage caused by the FCPA 
prosecution to the company’s reputation). 
164 See Podgor, supra note 144, at 79. 
165 See id. (discussing Arthur Andersen’s death upon criminal conviction and noting 
that even the later reversal of his conviction by the Supreme Court did not revive the de-
funct company and did not affect the company’s ability to continue doing business). 
166 See Palazzolo, supra note 139; see also Zarin, supra note 48, at 1-6–1-7 (discussing the 
impact of an indictment under the FCPA); Ned Sebelius, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 579, 598 (2008) (discussing disbarment and suspension from govern-
ment contracts as sanctions for violations of the FCPA provisions). For example, Siemens 
AG and Alcatel-Lucent were reportedly barred from bidding on several contracts after the 
firms announced their FCPA settlements. See Palazzolo, supra note 139. 
167 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1237. It is possible that companies settling with the DOJ to 
avoid a criminal charge might be barred from future World Bank financial projects. See 
World Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank 
Borrowers § 1.22 (rev. 2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRO 
CUREMENT/Resources/ConGuid-10-06-RevMay10-ev2.pdf. 
168 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 6. 
169 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1237 (noting that unchecked FCPA enforcement can 
lead to a company’s exclusion from foreign markets, either due to the increased costs of 
doing business or the company’s deliberate decision to avoid potentially problematic 
countries altogether). 
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FCPA scrutiny—do not currently face.170 This significant disparity in 
regulation and enforcement between those companies that are subject 
to FCPA scrutiny and those that are not frequently results in increased 
prices of company products as businesses pass on the extra costs to con-
sumers.171 It is estimated that the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have 
cost up to $1 billion annually in lost U.S. export trade.172 Furthermore, 
the companies subject to FCPA scrutiny might lose attractive business 
opportunities if their foreign joint venture partners are unwilling to 
adopt costly compliance measures and become exposed to the risk of 
an FCPA investigation.173 
 In addition, many companies, fearing FCPA complications, might 
choose to forego some attractive international opportunities in jurisdic-
tions where the culture of corruption is so prevalent that compliance 
efforts—no matter how thorough and costly—fail to sufficiently reduce 
enforcement risks.174 FCPA enforcement has been compared to de fac-
to sanctions on countries where corruption is rife, as many American 
companies simply avoid corruption-prone states, thereby losing lucra-
tive business opportunities in their attempts to avoid prosecution.175 As 
a result, uncertainties about FCPA enforcement lead to non-pursuit or 
abandonment of business deals that would have been completed oth-
erwise.176 Such chilling of international investment and abandonment 
of opportunities in developing countries stands in direct opposition to 
the business-promoting goals pursued by Congress when the FCPA was 
enacted.177 
                                                                                                                      
170 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 7. U.S. companies now have to incorporate large 
compliance and monitoring costs in their budgets—something that many of their interna-
tional competitors still do not have to do. See id. 
171 See id. at 2–3. 
172 See Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 6. 
173 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 7. 
174 See id.; see also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 135, at 818–20 (noting the FCPA’s 
chilling effect on commerce and arguing that businesses are likely to forego profitable 
opportunities in emerging markets fearing FCPA violation); Yockey, supra note 80, at 824 
(noting that a recent Dow Jones survey found that 51% of companies have delayed, and 
14% have cancelled, foreign ventures due to uncertainty over FCPA enforcement). 
175 See A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 1, at 68; see also IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 1 
(noting that current trends in enforcement chill international mergers as more U.S. com-
panies walk away from purchases of foreign businesses fearing that they might acquire 
costly liabilities); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery 
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 351, 371 (2010) 
(arguing that the current enforcement regime constitutes de facto sanctions). 
176 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 1–2. 
177 See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4100–01. 
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D. Hidden Costs: Unexpected Consequences of Increased Enforcement 
 Aggressive enforcement of vague rules can potentially lead to an-
other unexpected result—an increase of litigation among corpora-
tions.178 Competitors might bring a suit after losing a foreign contract 
and allege that the contract was lost because of the defendant’s illegal 
bribes.179 Time will tell if disgruntled or vindictive companies will use 
DOJ indictments to make frivolous claims just to expose their competi-
tors to the high costs of DOJ review.180 Furthermore, in a foreign cul-
ture where allegations come easy and evidence is not readily available, 
the mere threat of DOJ investigation can become powerful leverage for 
less scrupulous corporations against their competitors.181 
 The effect of the FCPA’s aggressive enforcement, however, goes 
beyond substantial penalties and compliance costs imposed on specific 
companies and industrial sectors.182 By creating an asymmetry in global 
competition, FCPA enforcement can arguably tax the U.S. economy as a 
whole and chill business activity.183 U.S. companies lose their competi-
                                                                                                                      
178 See Vega, supra note 78, at 456–57, 466 (remarking that the FCPA allows for a pri-
vate course of action for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) or under federal antitrust laws if the contested conduct vio-
lates the anti-bribery provisions). Although the FCPA does not provide an express or im-
plied private right of action, the components of an FCPA violation are often similar to 
those of RICO, which expressly allows private rights of action, and as a result private liti-
gants might use RICO to bring a claim against a competitor that violated the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA. See Raymond J. Dowd, Note, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal 
of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 Fordham Int’l L.J. 946, 946–47 
(1991); see also Jason E. Prince, A Rose by Any Other Name? Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-
Inspired Civil Actions, Advoc., Apr. 2009, at 22 (arguing that plaintiffs “are increasingly 
making an end-run around the FCPA’s lack of a private right of action through an array of 
FCPA-inspired civil suits”). 
179 See Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 5, at 6. 
180 See Vega, supra note 78, at 456–57 (noting a sharp increase in private lawsuits alleg-
ing FCPA violations and suggesting that former business partners, vindictive competitors, 
or terminated employees can resort to private litigation on FCPA grounds to get compen-
sation). 
181 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 16 (noting that companies that are not subject 
to the FCPA can use the threat of the DOJ’s aggressive and costly enforcement to their own 
advantage). 
182 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 1–2. 
183 See id.; see, e.g., Nichols, supra note 10, at 287 (noting that the FCPA’s vagueness and 
its failure to distinguish between illegal and allowable conduct “possibly chills what might 
be legitimate business activity”); Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation 
in the United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 Mo. 
L. Rev. 415, 418 (2011) (arguing that the current trend of FCPA enforcement “counter-
productively chill investments in certain markets by discouraging corporate entry into 
transitioning economies”); Dionne Searcey, In Antibribery Law, Some Fear Inadvertent Chill on 
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tive edge because of the significantly increased cost of doing business 
abroad, which prevents companies from growing and developing their 
businesses, and thus negatively affects the U.S. economy.184 The unpre-
dictability of FCPA enforcement further causes many foreign corpora-
tions to avoid registration in the United States in an effort to avoid the 
FCPA’s jurisdiction.185 Between 2007 and 2011, at least sixty companies 
removed their stock from U.S. stock exchanges citing “high administra-
tive, regulatory and other costs” associated with a U.S. listing.186 Simi-
larly, it has been suggested that concerns about the aggressive and fre-
quently unpredictable application of the FCPA makes foreign compa-
nies reluctant to invest in U.S. businesses or register their securities in 
the United States because of fears of falling under the FCPA’s jurisdic-
tion.187 Such apprehension on behalf of foreign businesses reportedly 
contributed to a substantial decrease in the relative share of Initial Pub-
lic Offerings (IPOs) listed on U.S. exchanges.188 In 2010, for example, 
only one of the ten largest global IPOs took place in the United States.189 
Thus, unpredictable and aggressive FCPA enforcement decreases the 
attractiveness of the U.S. market to international businesses that fear 
FCPA scrutiny and negatively affects the competitiveness of U.S. busi-
nesses abroad.190 
 In addition, stringent FCPA enforcement may actually exacerbate 
global corruption.191 The unpredictability of FCPA scrutiny frequently 
                                                                                                                      
Business, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 2009, at A9 (discussing the possible chilling effect of FCPA 
enforcement). 
184 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 1–2, 7; see also Taylor, supra note 75, at 868–69 
(contending that U.S. businesses are “extremely disadvantaged” as compared to their foreign 
competitors, which are not subject to FCPA jurisdiction); Gene Koretz, Bribes Can Cost the 
U.S. an Edge, Bus. Wk., Apr. 15, 1996, at 30, 30, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
archives/1996/b3471041.arc.htm#B3471043 (reporting that within five years of the FCPA’s 
enactment, direct investment by U.S. businesses in countries known for corruption problems 
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185 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 21. 
186 See id. at 21 & n.77 (noting that the substantial costs incurred by compliance with 
FCPA provisions, augmented by uncertainty of the statutory provisions, were important but 
not the only costs that influenced companies in their decisions to delist their stock). Daim-
ler, for example, made such an announcement just one month after the company agreed 
to a $185 million FCPA settlement. See id. at 21 n.78. 
187 See id. at 1. 
188 See id. at 21. 
189 See 2010 Global IPO Market Review and 2011 Outlook: China: The New IPO Capital, Ren-
aissance Capital, 15 ( Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ipohome/review/ 
2010review.pdf. 
190 See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text. 
191 See IBTC Report, supra note 70, at 22. 
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scares U.S. firms away from certain transactions and even certain juris-
dictions rife with corruption.192 This leaves developing nations inun-
dated by less scrupulous, non-U.S. firms which operate under less re-
straining regulations and benefit from the absence of strong and ethi-
cal competition.193 
III. Weighing Proposed Solutions 
 This Part analyzes proposed solutions made by critics and legisla-
tors that seek to resolve the FCPA’s ambiguity and make compliance 
both feasible and economically viable.194 This Part further addresses 
shortcomings of the most common approaches and suggests a hybrid 
strategy that would better address both the companies’ concerns and 
the DOJ’s enforcement agenda.195 
 This Note argues that in the FCPA context, the application of strict 
vicarious liability to a company for the unauthorized violations of its 
corporate agents is inefficient and counterproductive.196 Though insti-
tuted to enhance compliance and prevent wrongdoing, the FCPA fre-
quently leads to unexpected results, dissuading corporations from in-
vestigating possible misconduct and discouraging them from reporting 
detected crimes because increased compliance expenditures would also 
increase the probability of government detection.197 Companies must 
decide whether to voluntarily self-report the detected misconduct, and 
                                                                                                                      
192 See Andy Spalding, Beyond Balance IV: New Players, Same Playing Field, FCPA Blog 
(Feb. 3, 2012, 4:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/3/beyond-balance-iv-
new-players-same-playing-field.html. 
193 See Andy Spalding, American Values or Chinese Profits?, FCPA Blog (May 23, 2011 7:18 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/23/american-values-or-chinese-profits.html; 
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operate outside the FCPA’s reach, the latter pay bribes and “engage in other socially de-
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194 See infra notes 206–238 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 221–226, 233–253 and accompanying text. 
196 See Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–36 (noting that strict liability can create perverse 
incentives); see also William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1365–66 (1999) (calling the reasons behind extending 
strict vicarious liability “shallow and inadequate”); supra notes 117–138 and accompanying 
text (discussing the failure of strict liability policy to ensure corporate compliance). 
197 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 154; see also Arlen, supra note 113, at 835–
36 (noting that studies of corporate behavior suggested that if the company’s expected 
cost incurred by an increase in its expected criminal liability exceeds the expected benefit 
of the reduction in the number of violations, a company subject to strict vicarious liability 
will not respond by increasing its enforcement expenditures because additional compli-
ance would only increase its expected criminal liability). 
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even after release of November 2012 guidance they face considerable 
uncertainty about whether disclosure will reduce the sanctions or in-
stead expose them to massive liability.198 Risk-neutral businesses would 
frequently choose not to report misconduct if they believed the reduc-
tion they receive is insubstantial and the misconduct itself is unlikely to 
be independently detected by law enforcement.199 The government, 
however, cannot readily detect FCPA violations, and cooperation by 
companies is crucial to the successful fight against corruption.200 Thus, 
enforcement of the FCPA should provide sufficient incentives for com-
panies to comply with the statutory provisions and report detected mis-
conduct to authorities if necessary.201 
 To date, most of the suggested solutions advocate for a compliance 
defense or various leniency schemes.202 Such approaches have positive 
effects on compliance and thus contribute to long-term reduction of 
misconduct.203 Alone, however, each is insufficient to provide compa-
nies with guidance or resolve the power imbalance between the prose-
cution and businesses fearing the enormous costs associated with an 
FCPA indictment.204 This Note suggests a hybrid approach, combining 
the institution of a statutory compliance defense with the introduction 
of a formal leniency program.205 
                                                                                                                      
198 See Koehler, supra note 15, at 968; Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 154. 
199 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 154–55. 
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202 See, e.g., FCPA Hearing, supra note 94, at 23 (advocating for the creation of a compli-
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203 See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 128, at 236 (noting that clear and predictable pol-
icies provide incentive for compliance, cooperation, and self-disclosure). 
204 See infra notes 221–226, 233–238 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra notes 239–253 and accompanying text. 
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A. Legislative Change: Creation of a Statutory Defense of Adequate Compliance 
 One of the most supported proposals to resolve the above outlined 
FCPA problems involves legislative changes to the statute.206 Proposed 
changes include clarification of vague and overly broad statutory terms 
and the creation of an affirmative defense of adequate compliance.207 
The existence of an internal compliance policy is currently insufficient 
to safeguard a company from liability for the violations of its employ-
ees.208 Instead of encouraging compliance, rigid enforcement coupled 
with the lack of an adequate compliance defense reduces a company’s 
incentive to invest in internal anti-bribery policies and to monitor and 
report any identified violations.209 The creation of a statutory compli-
ance defense has been suggested as a solution to the undesired effect of 
reduced compliance.210 The adequate compliance defense would not 
be absolute; a company would still need to show that it reasonably im-
plemented and maintained an anti-bribery program.211 Meeting these 
conditions would only afford a rebuttable presumption that the com-
pany as an entity is not liable for the FCPA violations of its rogue em-
ployees.212 Nonbinding and advisory in nature, the November 2012 
Resource Guide suggests only general principles of best practices, and 
does not provide specific recommendations or reliable guidance as to 
how compliance might affect prosecutorial decisions.213 
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 Experience in other countries further supports the creation of a 
compliance defense.214 Anti-bribery legislation in the United Kingdom, 
enacted in 2010, established adequate internal compliance as an af-
firmative defense and so far there has not been any suggestion that the 
defense has been abused by corporations.215 Additionally, twelve signa-
tories to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, including Australia, Germany, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, also have some form of working compliance 
defense.216 
  The advantage of this statutory solution is that it will increase 
compliance with the FCPA and provide businesses with sufficient incen-
tive to identify and self-report violations.217 Given that FCPA crimes are 
hard to detect by outsiders, proactive compliance by businesses can 
substantially decrease the rate of violations.218 This statutory solution 
will also give businesses some protection from prosecutors, who can no 
longer prosecute compliant corporations for the acts of a single em-
ployee.219 By providing businesses with an affirmative defense, this solu-
tion will reduce the power disparity between prosecutor and prose-
cuted that is intrinsic to the FCPA.220 
                                                                                                                      
214 See The Compliance Defense Around the World, FCPA Professor ( June 28, 2011), 
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219 See Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 13; Sarah Baumgartel, Nonprosecution 
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Wis. L. Rev. 25, 58 n.145. 
220 See Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 13; Thomas, supra note 19, at 462 (noting 
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 The significant disadvantage of this solution, however, is that with-
out further changes, it will not add sufficient clarity or predictability to 
the enforcement process.221 Yes, companies will be able to defend 
themselves in any action by the DOJ, but they still will be forced to 
guess whether the FCPA applies in each specific situation.222 Further-
more, given the trend toward a broad interpretation of the FCPA, com-
panies will need guidance in designing and implementing an adequate 
compliance defense—without such guidance, the defense will be mean-
ingless.223 Lastly, there is a possibility that companies will not use the 
defense because to use an affirmative defense, a company must actually 
engage in litigation.224 Given the high direct and indirect costs of liti-
gating FCPA matters, companies will strive to avoid situations in which 
an affirmative defense might become relevant.225 As a result, although 
creation of a statutory compliance defense has been advocated heavily 
by practitioners and academics, when employed alone it is unlikely to 
resolve the uncertainty companies are currently facing or significantly 
affect the power imbalance between law enforcement and businesses.226 
B. The DOJ Initiative: Regulatory Provisions 
 Another approach that would alleviate the ambiguity currently fac-
ing companies is the introduction of formal leniency policies.227 Such 
policies would provide incentives to companies to report corporate 
crimes and enable businesses to make informed decisions by requiring 
the DOJ to convey clearly and predictably how the sanctions could be 
reduced for those companies that self-report violations.228 Although the 
DOJ currently takes compliance into consideration, the available dis-
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count is not known until the very end of investigation, and thus self-
reporting is still too risky for businesses contemplating reporting an 
FCPA crime.229 The introduction of formal policies, clearly communi-
cated in advance, would help businesses make a decision to invest in 
compliance.230 To further incentivize proactive compliance, such poli-
cies might differentiate between leniency applied before and after an 
investigation has begun.231 This approach would provide greater cer-
tainty and predictability to corporations of the benefits of self-reporting 
violations, and would thus have the potential to reduce the miscon-
duct.232 
 There are several disadvantages to the leniency proposal.233 First, 
despite ensuring increased cooperation with law enforcement, the leni-
ency solution on its own also fails to address concerns about the ambi-
guity of the FCPA’s terminology or to alleviate the pressure to settle to 
avoid substantial direct and indirect costs incurred by litigation.234 Sec-
ond, the solution also fails to guide businesses in their attempt to build 
a compliance program: instead of interpreting the FCPA’s require-
ments, this solution merely provides an incentive to disclose the identi-
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fied violation.235 Third, some critics argue that the application of the 
leniency program, borrowed from the DOJ’s antitrust prosecution, is 
simply improper in the FCPA context.236 In antitrust prosecutions, of-
ten the goal is to uncover cartels; rewarding a cooperating company 
that assists in the investigation does not prevent the DOJ from prosecut-
ing the rest of the businesses in the alleged cartel.237 In the FCPA con-
text, however, there is usually only one violator involved; thus, reward-
ing a cooperating company might leave no one else responsible—and 
punishable—for the crime.238 
C. A Hybrid Solution 
 Most U.S. businesses are eager to comply with the FCPA but are 
perplexed by the vagueness of the current requirements.239 It is the role 
of both legislators and regulators to dispel this confusion.240 This Note 
advocates for a hybrid approach that would combine the introduction of 
a statutory compliance defense with the creation of a DOJ leniency pol-
icy.241 A compliance defense, a statutory change promulgated by legisla-
tors, can be used by companies when litigation has already com-
menced.242 Alternately, a comprehensive leniency policy, initiated by 
the regulatory agencies, can be invoked pre-indictment.243 Thus, a hy-
brid approach would provide protection to businesses at any stage of 
investigative inquiry.244 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition, such a hybrid approach would make compliance eco-
nomically viable by providing companies with incentives to institute 
costly compliance programs, self-report violations, and cooperate with 
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www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fcpa-reform-and-corporate-leniency-21801. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See Doty, supra note 11, at 1255. 
240 See id. 
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accompanying text. 
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pany has engaged in the litigation process). 
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law enforcement.245 At the same time, this approach provides compa-
nies with needed leverage in negotiations with aggressive prosecutors, 
who, in the absence of judicial oversight, have unfettered discretion in 
the enforcement of ambiguous terms.246 
 Although this hybrid solution in itself does not provide instructions 
or clarify ambiguous statutory terms, it does reduce uncertainty and 
provides companies with more leverage.247 This hybrid solution enables 
companies to defend themselves and challenge the DOJ’s position, and 
thus diminishes the absolute discretion currently enjoyed by prosecu-
tors.248 Therefore, a combination of legislative and regulatory changes 
will turn current enforcement from an authoritative prosecutorial mon-
ologue into a more collaborative and productive dialogue between 
prosecutors and companies.249 This dialogue will benefit all.250 Compa-
nies will have a greater voice in the investigations, and as a result will 
have more incentive to invest in compliance or report detected viola-
tions.251 The DOJ will benefit from enhanced compliance proce-
dures.252 And the economy will benefit as a result of fewer bribes and 
stricter compliance.253 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 The broad terms of the anti-bribery provisions, dearth of judicial 
decisions, and little specific official guidance from the DOJ creates sub-
stantial uncertainty for companies trying to comply with stringent FCPA 
provisions. Recent guidance issued by the DOJ and SEC was praised as a 
useful and comprehensive resource but critics have repeatedly noted 
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at 26 (arguing that a compliance defense would increase compliance with the FCPA and 
provide needed protection to businesses from costly liability for the acts of rogue employ-
ees); Cohen et al., supra note 90, at 1269–70 (noting that most companies want to comply 
with the rules but are hurt by the lack of clear guidance). 
246 See supra notes 196–238 and accompanying text; see also Thomas, supra note 19, at 
462 (discussing the “tremendous imbalance” of power between prosecutor and defendant 
and commenting on potential “large-scale prosecutorial abuse”). 
247 See Weissmann & Smith, supra note 6, at 18; Thomas, supra note 19, at 462; supra 
notes 235–245 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 194–238 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 194–238 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 194–238 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 131–138 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 131–138 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text; see also Arlen, supra note 113, at 
835–36, 835 n.10 (arguing that white collar crimes are difficult for the government to de-
tect and it is therefore important to provide sufficient incentive to disclose). 
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that the report mostly compiles in one place publicly available informa-
tion and does not provide any real clarity or new information. Regard-
less of the efforts companies extend to implement internal compliance 
policies, there is no provision for a compliance defense and a company 
can be indicted for an unauthorized action of a single rogue employee. 
The substantial costs associated with litigating in federal courts and the 
dire reputational consequences of indictment force most businesses to 
settle with the DOJ before trial. In the absence of judicial oversight, fed-
eral prosecutors end up with a significant and largely unchecked share 
of lawmaking and interpretive authority. 
 A hybrid approach, combining the introduction of a statutory 
compliance defense (available only after litigation has started) with le-
niency policies clearly delineating the scope of expected compliance 
and providing discounts for compliance and cooperation (available at 
the pre-indictment stage during negotiations with the DOJ), would pro-
tect businesses at all stages of an investigation. This approach would 
make compliance economically viable by providing companies with in-
centives to engage in thorough compliance, self-report violations, and 
cooperate with enforcement, while also providing businesses leverage 
in negotiations with the DOJ. Most importantly, however, increased 
compliance and clear incentives for self-reporting will identify more 
violations and contribute to an overall reduction of corporate bribery. 
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